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Abstract 
Pricing of road use, both in Australia and elsewhere, has long been recognised as an area where current 
arrangements are economically inefficient but also politically very difficult to change.  The 2011 
Australian Tax Forum provides an opportunity to revisit this question and lay out a pathway for change.  
This paper summarises some past analyses of the costs of road use in Australia, to demonstrate the 
broad extent of under-recovery of costs.  The external costs, such as congestion, accidents and 
greenhouse gas emissions, which are the reason for the cost recovery gap are outlined.  International 
experience with congestion charging, a key component (but not the whole) of road pricing reform is 
summarised, showing how sustained reductions in congestion levels and associated costs are 
achievable.  That experience also shows the importance of political leadership to achieve 
implementation, often in the face of minority support pre-implementation.  Some illustrative 
calculations of how Australian road use charges may need to increase, on average, under a reformed 
road pricing regime are presented.  The paper concludes by arguing that an independently run two year 
community conversation around reforming road pricing, reporting to COAG, is the critical starting point 
if there is to be a successful implementation program. 
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1. Context 
1.1 The Tax Forum 
The Australian Government has announced that a Tax Forum will be held in October.  The 
Treasurer’s introduction to a Discussion Paper for the Forum points out that (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2011, p. vi): 
The Tax Forum is an opportunity to hear from all parts of the Australian community about the 
future of our tax and transfer system. 
That paper indicates that the government’s approach to tax reform is built around: 
1. Reform to make the economy stronger; 
2. Reform to make the tax system fairer; 
3. Reform to make the tax system simpler. 
Session 5 of the Tax Forum is suggested as being concerned with Environmental and Social 
Taxes, the Discussion paper noting that (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p, 29): 
In some circumstances, specific taxes ... can be used to improve market or social outcomes by 
addressing spillover costs through appropriate price signalling.  User charging can also play a 
complementary role to signal underlying resource costs of publicly-provided goods and services. 
Road transport is mentioned as an example of an area where this approach may be relevant, 
The Discussion paper reminding readers that (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p, 29): 
  
The AFTS review recommended that governments should consider the introduction of variable 
congestion pricing.  Beyond that, the review commented that new technologies may further 
enable wider application of road pricing if proven cost-effective. 
With respect to Environmental and Social taxes, the Discussion paper invites possible discussion on 
three areas at the Tax Forum (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 31): 
1. Should Australia consider ways to more closely link road charging to the impact users have on 
the condition and upkeep of roads? 
2. Is there a case to more closely link road charging to the impact users have on the level of 
congestion on particular roads? 
3. Are there aspects of other tax arrangements that create unintended incentives for adverse 
environmental outcomes, or ways in which governments could use specific taxes to ensure that 
people take appropriate account of environmental impacts in their decision making? 
The present paper takes the opportunity to contribute to this discussion.  
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1.2 Australia’s Future Tax System (AFTS) 
In May 2010, the Commonwealth Government released the report of the AFTS review (sometimes 
known as the Henry Tax Review).  That review reported1: 
Current road tax arrangements will not meet Australia's future transport challenges. Poorly functioning 
road networks harm the amenity, sustainability, liveability and productivity of society. Moving from 
indiscriminate taxes to efficient prices would allow Australia to leverage the value of its existing 
transport infrastructure. Less congested roads, shorter travel times and investment in road infrastructure 
that addresses user demand would provide a foundation for further productivity growth, improved living 
standards and more sustainable cities. 
The AFTS review suggested location-specific congestion charges, removal of cross-subsidies in heavy 
vehicle charging for road use and regulatory solutions to negative spillovers not currently amenable to 
pricing, in return for lower taxes on road use (excise) and some other reforms of current road user 
charges.  It argued that investment in roads should be guided by the results of comprehensive and 
transparent cost benefit analyses.  The review expected substantial benefits to flow from these reforms. 
1.3 COAG Road Reform Plan (CRRP) 
Following a Productivity Commission 2006 inquiry into road and rail freight infrastructure pricing 
(Productivity Commission 2006), the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) initiated a Road Reform 
Plan (CRRP), to develop and evaluate options for heavy vehicle pricing reform and road funding and 
expenditure reform.    
CRRP has recently produced a draft report evaluating pricing and funding options (CRRP 2011), in which 
it proposes a staged move to charging heavy vehicles for their road use based on measures of the static 
mass of the vehicle, the actual distance travelled and its location on the road network (mass/distance/ 
location or MDL charging).  It is noteworthy that the technology required to implement MDL charging 
could be extended from the heavy vehicle fleet to all vehicles should a comprehensive road pricing 
reform program be pursued, as proposed in the present paper.  
The CRRP process is very narrow in its focus.  It excludes light vehicles (which constitute the majority of 
the Australian vehicle fleet) and ignores all external costs other than road damage.  It would be 
remarkable and if such a narrowly based terms of reference produced a significant enhancement in the 
efficiency of the Australian land transport task!  
1.4 This Paper 
Against the background of the three reports noted above, this paper looks at the external costs of road 
use in Australia and suggests it is time to commence a more ambitious road pricing reform program.  
Some illustrative calculations of externality charges are presented, using an optimisation model 
                                                            
1 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/papers/Final_Report
_Part_1/chapter_8.htm 
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developed by Dr Ian Parry from Resources for the Future.  A version of Dr Parry’s model was used by 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) in providing advice to the Henry Tax Review2.   
2. External Costs of Road Use 
Economic theory recognises that, in a competitive market economy, the existence of external costs and 
benefits creates a situation where the market decisions of individual consumers and producers no 
longer add up to an efficient outcome for society3.  Market prices do not reflect these externalities and 
there will be too much (negative externality) or too little (positive externality) production of the good or 
service that causes the externality.   In general, market pricing on the basis of social costs, not private (or 
internal) costs, is a requisite for efficient resource allocation4.   
In land transport, most discussion of external costs has focused on the external costs of road use.  The 
typical external costs that are usually considered in this context are: 
 congestion 
 greenhouse gas emissions 
 local air pollution 
 noise pollution 
 the external cost of accidents 
 road damage. 
It is also arguable that high community dependence on motor vehicles increases risks of social exclusion 
for many people, which suggests that there is also a social exclusion external cost of road use (Stanley et 
al., 2011a,b). 
Europe has had an active interest in externality costing of transport for four decades, with this interest 
increasing over the last two decades.  The important ExternE project to cost externalities started in 
19915, with external costs of road use being one of its major interests.  Maddison et al. (1996) brought 
together much of the international work at the time, with a UK focus.    
A major report prepared for the (then) UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
in 2001 suggested that road user charges covered total costs of road use on a fully allocated cost basis, if 
congestion costs are not included, but that the marginal costs of use (which include congestion costs) 
were two to three times the relevant marginal revenue levels (Sansom et al., 2001).  In terms of the 
requirements for efficient pricing, this suggested a need for some increases in charges for road use, 
particularly in peak periods, because of the high levels of congestion costs (even though UK fuel taxes 
were already far higher than those in Australia).  That report estimated total fully allocated road costs 
for Great Britain of 3.34-7.20 pence/vehicle kilometre and marginal costs of 12.3-16.3p/vkm (Sansom et 
al., 2001, Table B, page v). 
                                                            
2 They used the model as set out in Parry and Small (2007). 
3 External costs describe a situation where there are uncompensated costs of transactions that accrue to third 
parties, who did not agree to whatever caused these costs (conversely for external benefits).   
4 The idea of imposing a tax or charge to correct market prices for negative externalities has a long history in 
economics, usually associated with the work of Pigou (1920) (hence the term Pigovian tax). 
5 http://www.externe.info/ 
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US interest in externality costing of road use also has a long history.  In recent years, Dr Ian Parry and 
colleagues at Resources for the Future have published extensively in this area, with their main focus 
being the US (see, for example, Parry and Small 2005; Parry 2008; Parry 2009; Safirova et al. 2007).  
Parry’s work is notable because it examines external costs of transport within the broader context of the 
taxation system, seeking to optimise road user charges within this broader setting.  He draws on 
Ramsey’s (1927) insight that taxes for raising revenue should be higher on goods whose price elasticities 
are lower.  Parry’s work suggests a need for substantially increasing taxes on highway fuels in the US 
(where they are much lower than in Australia) and using the revenues to finance reductions in 
distortionary income taxes (Parry 2009).  He acknowledges, however, that there is still room to sharpen 
estimates of some external costs and that his estimates of optimal fuel taxes should be treated with 
some caution. 
In terms of quantifying specific external costs in the US context, Parry (2009) produced the figures 
shown in Table 1.  These cost estimates are marginal costs, showing the expected change in the costs in 
question for a unit change in traffic levels.  The way the costs are cited suggests that marginal costs 
equal average costs. 
Table 1: Marginal External Costs  
External Costs Cost (Petrol Cars) (2007) 
Air pollution 
Accidents (external cost only) 
Climate change 
Oil dependency 
Congestion 
1c/mile 
3.5c/mile 
9c/gallon (at $10/t CO2) 
10c/gallon 
4.5c/mile 
Source: Parry (2009) 
The most comprehensive early Australian examination of external costs of road use was probably the 
Bus Industry Confederation’s submission to the 2001 Commonwealth Fuel Tax Inquiry, a submission 
whose preparation was assisted by ExternE project consultant, Paul Watkiss (BIC 2001), who was also a 
co-author of Sansom et al. (2001).  That submission estimated the total external costs of road transport 
in Australia at $30.5 billion (Table 2).  Revenues collected by governments from road users were 
estimated at $11.5 billion, well below the total external costs.  The CRRP process (see section 1.3 above) 
is only concerned with less than $2 billion of such expenditure, this being the heavy vehicle part of road 
costs.  Stanley (2010) has updated the costs and revenues shown in Table 2 and estimated the total 
external costs of road use at over $40b, with revenues at $16 billion, suggesting a wider total deficit 
than a decade ago. 
The 2001 BIC research presented estimates of fuel-based charges that might be used to cover various 
external costs, with congestion costs excluded – on the argument that this should be charged on a city- 
specific basis, rather than being recovered through fuel charges.  BIC argued that its analysis (Table 3 
below) showed that, in addition to road users as a whole not meeting the full external costs of their road 
use (as per Table 2 above) (BIC 2001, p. 76): 
 the current fuel excise (~38c/L) is probably about right as a charge for internalising the costs of 
urban road use by cars, ignoring congestion costs, but is too high in relation to rural road use by 
cars; 
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 the external costs of urban road use by heavy vehicles are probably higher than the current 
excise rate (ignoring congestion costs) but rural external costs for these vehicles are probably 
similar to current excise rates. 
An implication of this analysis was that heavy vehicles should not receive any rebates of the fuel excise, 
unless they could demonstrate they create external benefits (as can be shown for buses, which reduce 
external costs of road use). 
Table 2: Total External Costs of Road Transport and Road-Related Revenues (2001) 
Cost/Revenue Item Total ($b) 
COSTS 
Road expenditure 
Congestion 
Air pollution 
Climate change 
Noise 
Accidents 
Total Costs 
 
REVENUES 
Commonwealth excise 
Less diesel fuel rebate 
Less DAFGS 
Registration fees  
Total Revenues 
 
ROAD “DEFICIT” 
 
4.6 
12.8 
4.3 
2.4 
1.2 
5 
  30.3 
 
 
12 
-2 
-0.7 
2.2 
11.5 
 
~$20B. 
 
Source: BIC (2001) 
 
Table 3: Proposed Fuel Based Externality Charges for a range of Road Transport Vehicles  
(c/L; CNG = c/kg; 2001 prices) 
 
Cost Component Cars (petrol) 
Urban        Rural
 
Artic. Trucks 
Urban           Rural 
Buses 
Urban               Rural           Urban CNG 
Infrastructure 
Congestion 
Air pollution 
Climate change 
Noise 
Accidents 
  8                  8 
  0                  0 
2-10              0 
  9                  9 
  7                  0 
  8                  8 
  20                  20 
    0                    0 
 7-31                 0 
   11                 11 
     7                   7 
     4                   4 
  20                       20                    16 
    0                         0                      0 
 6-24                      0                   5-10 
   11                       11                    11 
     7                         0                      7 
     4                         4                      4 
Totals 34-42           25 49-73              35 48-66                    35                 43-48 
Source: BIC (2001) 
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Drawing on much of the BIC work, the Victorian Department of Transport subsequently produced 
external cost estimates for use in project evaluations and this work has now been broadened into 
Australian Transport Council evaluation guidelines6, which set out a comprehensive set of external costs 
and proposed values for use in project/program evaluation.  Many other countries have done likewise, 
with the UK Webtag system7 and Dutch evaluation handbook notable (Maibach et al. 2007).  
More recently, oil dependence has been noted as a possible external cost of road use (Parry and Small 
2005), as has obesity from high reliance on motor vehicle travel, with associated diminished physical 
exercise (Stanley and Barrett 2010).   
Clarke and Prentice (2009), in their research paper for the Henry Tax Review (AFTS), discussed the 
external costs of road use in Australia, drawing particularly on the work of Parry and Small (2007).  We 
draw on some of the Clarke and Prentice analysis below. 
The main conclusions the authors draw from this brief overview of research on the external costs 
oftransport are that: 
 there is now a long history of quantifying the external costs of transport; 
 the focus of this quantification has been on the external costs of road use; 
 Australian road users do not meet the full social costs of their travel choices; 
 road damage costs tend to be dwarfed by other external costs of road use, which suggests that 
road use charging regimes should have a much broader focus than simply seeking to recover 
only road damage costs and, in Australia’s case, explicitly only heavy vehicle road damage costs; 
 the gap between the total external costs (and marginal costs) of road use in Australia, and 
current road user charges, is increasing, suggesting that there is increasing urgency for reform of 
road pricing; 
 the growing international literature on the externalities of road use, and increasing 
implementation of congestion pricing schemes, suggests that there is likely to be a growing 
incidence of such initiatives in the coming decade.  
3. Changing How Road Use is Priced 
3.1 Congestion Pricing 
The discussion on the size of external costs ceased to be an abstract intellectual exercise for economists 
when a number of countries actually implemented explicit road pricing regimes which recognised that 
externalities are important price setting inclusions for improving resource allocation efficiency.  The 
major externality that has been recognised in terms of transport pricing regimes is congestion, where 
cities such as Singapore, London, Stockholm and several Norwegian cities have implemented schemes 
(area or cordon-based charging), places such as Oregon have had trials and the Dutch have gone close to 
implementing a comprehensive GPS-based pricing scheme.    
Professor Tony May from Leeds University has reviewed congestion pricing schemes, Box 1 summarising 
his main findings.   The evidence is compelling that there is no other initiative that can reduce road 
                                                            
6 http://www.atcouncil.gov.au/documents/files/National_Guidelines_Volume_3.pdf 
7 http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/ 
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traffic levels so much, so quickly and in such a sustained manner.  UK research suggests that reductions 
in road traffic levels of 4% can cut congestion costs by about 40% (DfT 2004, Table B).  A pricing solution 
helps to ensure that traffic reductions do not attract additional traffic levels back to fill the void, such 
that congestion cost savings (benefits) can actually be realised from congestion pricing solutions. In 
Section 3.2 below, we present some specific impact measures for particular schemes. 
 
Pricing reform in land transport is also a current concern in the US, where infrastructure backlogs and 
associated funding flows have been the subject of a major recent review.  The US National Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission report, Paying Our Way, proposes shifting from the 
current US road funding system, based largely on indirect user fees in the form of federal motor taxes, 
toward a new system built around more direct user charges, in the form of fees for miles driven (NSTIFC 
2009).  The Commission points out that the current US transport system is underpriced and that a 
vehicle mile travelled (VMT) charging system is the consensus choice for the future.  It proposes that the 
federal government commit to deploying such a system by 2020, this timeline recognising the difficulties 
in implementation.  Funding shortfalls in the US Highway Trust Fund provide a sharp edge to the 
consideration of this matter in the US.   
The Commission set out six guiding principles for its deliberations (NSTIFC 2009, pp 26-7): 
1. The funding and finance framework must support the overall goal of enhancing mobility of 
all users of the transportation system; 
2. The funding and financing framework must generate sufficient funding to meet national 
investment needs on a sustainable basis...; 
3. The funding and financing framework should cause users and direct beneficiaries to bear the 
full cost of using the transportation system to the greatest extent possible... This will not be 
possible in all instances, and when it is not, any cross-subsidisation must be intentional, fully 
Box 1: Impacts of Congestion Pricing Schemes 
Traffic reduction 
- 14-23% from schemes intended to reduce congestion (e.g. London, Stockholm), often 
growing over time  
- Less from schemes with lower charges, where revenue raising was the main purpose 
Impact on travel speeds 
- Relatively bigger than traffic reduction 
Impact on local business in charge area 
- Minimal 
Impact on emissions 
- Favourable but usually relatively less than congestion impact 
Impact on public acceptance 
- Usually weak before implementation then majority support 
 
Source: Based on May (2010) 
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transparent, and designed to meet network goals, equity goals, or other compelling 
purposes; 
4. The funding and financing framework should encourage investment in the transportation 
system... 
5. The funding and financing framework should incorporate equity considerations – for 
example, generational equity, equity across income groups, and geographic equity; 
6. The funding and financing framework should support the broad public policy objectives of 
energy independence and environmental protection. 
These guidelines are useful for any Australian consideration of land transport pricing reform.   
Importantly, the Commission found that future US transportation infrastructure financing requirements 
could be substantially reduced if a congestion charging scheme was in place.  The investment needed to 
maintain existing land transport system performance was estimated at 26% less under a congestion 
pricing regime.  Also, a congestion pricing regime was estimated to reduce future highway improvement 
costs by 28% but increase public transport investment needs by 28%, with a net reduction of 15% in land 
transport infrastructure improvement outlays overall (NSTIFC 2009, p. 57). 
3.2 Some Case Studies 
Li and Hensher (2010) have also reviewed the evidence about congestion charging schemes. Table 4 
summarises the real impacts after the first year of permanent implementation of four charging 
schemes8.  From the few monitoring studies, evidence shows that the various schemes resulted in 
significant reductions in traffic during charging hours (over 14 percent), faster speeds (e.g., 14 km/h to 
18 km/h for London), and increased public transport mode share (from a 6.2 percent increase for Milan 
to 21 percent for Singapore).  The 70% Singapore reduction in cars entering the charging zone during 
charge hours is striking but well beyond what might be need to be contemplated for Australia’s major 
cities!  
A common experience with implementation of congestion charging schemes, in particular, is minority 
popular support at time of implementation but subsequent majority support.  The Stockholm 
experience illustrates this phenomenon.  Borjesson et al. (2010) report that only 36% supported the 
Stockholm trial scheme, as it then was, prior to commencement.  Support increased to 52% once the 
trial started.  At the subsequent referendum on whether the scheme should continue, 53% voted yes.  
By 2009, support had increased to about three in four people.  Reasons for this increasing support, 
suggested by Borjesson et al. (2010) are: 
 benefits exceeding expectations; 
 costs falling short of expectations; 
 people accepting what was seen as unavoidable; 
 greater familiarity with the scheme. 
 
 London’s experience in terms of support for congestion charging pre and post implementation also 
reflects increasing support over time, supporting the arguments for a political approach that involves 
showing leadership.  
                                                            
8 Although the primary purpose of Milan’s scheme is pollution abatement, it has substantially reduced congestion.  
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Table 4: Real impacts of congestion pricing schemes 
 
 
 Congestion charging schemes  
Impacts of the projects  London Stockholm Milan Singapore
Reduction in traffic 
(vehicles with four or more 
wheels) entering the zone 
during charging hours  
18% 
trial: 22%, 
after permanent 
implementation:18% 
14.2% (23% during the 
morning peak hours) 
40-45% (Area Licensing Scheme), 
15% (Electronic road pricing) 
Reduction in cars entering 
the zone during charging 
hours  
33% Not available Not available 70% 
Change in traffic beyond 
charging hours  
Observed peak traffic 
after the charging 
hours in the first year, 
normalized in the 
coming years. 
Observed peak traffic after 
the charging hours in the 
first year, normalized in 
the coming years. 
Observed peak traffic 
after the charging hours +23% 
Change in traffic round the 
charging zone  -5% +10% -3.6% Not available 
Change in traffic in the 
inner road  +4% +5% Not available Not available 
Increase in speed inside the 
charging area  
30% (from 14 km/h to 
18km/h) 
30-50% (33% in the 
morning peak hours) 4% 20% 
Change in speed in the 
inner road  Not available Not available Not available -20% 
Increase in bus speed inside 
the charging area  6% Not available 
7.8% attributed to 
charging zone in 
combination with bus 
lanes. 
 
 
Not available 
Increase in the use of public 
transport  
above 7% totally, 37% 
in bus passengers 
entering the zone 
9% 6.2% totally, 9.2% in metro passengers 21% 
4. Getting the Prices Right 
4.1 Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
As noted in Section 1.4, Clarke and Prentice (2009) adapted the Parry and Small (2007) model to 
estimate optimal fuel charges for Australia.  As they explain, the Parry and Small model derives an 
optimal tax which both internalises a range of external costs of road use (local pollution, greenhouse gas 
emissions, energy security, accidents, congestion) and incorporates the efficiency trade-off between 
commodity taxation and income taxation, called the Ramsey component (such that the excess burden of 
different taxes can be included within a welfare optimising framework, along with external costs).9   
The Clarke and Prentice adaptation of the Parry and Small research led them to conclude that the 
Australian excise on fuel should be considerably higher than the current rate.  As shown in Table 4, their 
estimates ranged between $0.83c/L and $3.28c/L, well above the excise rate of 38.143c/L.  The major 
source of variability in their estimates is in the Ramsey component, which changes substantially as 
underlying modelling assumptions are varied (Table 5).  However, as Clarke and Prentice (2009) note, all 
their estimates suggest that simply recovering the external costs of road use through the fuel excise 
                                                            
9 For a detailed explanation of the model, its derivation and some applications, see Parry and Small (2007) and 
Parry (2009), while Clarke and Prentice (2009) present a summarised description of the model. 
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would require an increase of about 10c/L on the current excise rate, the externality component of their 
optimal fuel tax being relatively stable at just under 50c/L. 
 
Table 5: Clarke and Prentice Fuel Charge Estimates for Australia 
Basis of calculation Externality 
Component 
Ramsey 
Component 
Optimal Tax 
Australian estimate 
Australian estimate – high elasticity of 
demand 
Australian estimate – low share of 
government 
Australian estimate – higher labour supply 
elasticity 
$0.48 
$0.47 
 
$0.49 
 
$0.46 
$1.51 
$0.36 
 
$0.51 
 
$2.82 
$1.99 
$0.83 
 
$1.00 
 
$3.28 
Source: Clarke and Prentice (2009) Table 6. 
 
4.2 Stanley and Hensher Estimates 
4.2.1 Base Estimate 
Dr Ian Parry kindly made his optimal fuel tax models available to the current authors, for the purposes of 
this research paper.  To apply the model, we have adopted the assumptions set out in Table 6, in most 
cases aligning with assumptions adopted by Clarke and Prentice (2009) (who, in turn, frequently adopt 
the Parry and Small (2007) assumptions).  The Parry model uses gallons and miles, rather than litres and 
kilometres, but our results in Table 6 are expressed in terms of a cents/litre optimal fuel charge.  Road 
damage costs are not included, on the basis that marginal road damage costs relate primarily to heavy 
vehicle use and should be recovered from heavy vehicles. 
Our base optimal fuel (petrol) tax is $0.94/L (Table 7).10  The externality cost component is 44c/L (Table 
6), quite similar to the estimates produced by Clarke and Prentice and again suggesting that the 
Australian fuel excise is not sufficient to cover the external costs of road use.  The Ramsey tax 
component in the base estimate is $0.50c/L, similar to the Clarke and Prentice “low share of 
government” estimate, mainly because our base model run uses the 35% government spending share 
that Clarke and Prentice use as a sensitivity test for their low government spending share scenario.  In 
our base case, revenues to government from the fuel tax are more than double existing revenues but 
they increase relatively less than the increase in the fuel excise (or tax) rate, because higher fuel prices 
drive fuel economies. 
 
 
                                                            
10 Ideally, separate calculations would be done for petrol and diesel, covering (broadly) cars and heavy vehicles 
separately.  That is a matter for more detailed analysis, rather than this indicative piece of research. 
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Table 6: Parameter Assumptions Used for Base Application of Parry Model to Australia 
Parameter Base 
Value 
Used 
Comments 
Initial car fuel efficiency (miles/gallon) 
Pollution damage - distance-related (c/ml) 
Pollution damage - fuel-related (c/gal) 
 
External congestion costs (c/ml) 
External accident costs (c/ml) 
Fuel price elasticity 
VMT portion of fuel price elasticity 
VMT expenditure elasticity 
Uncompensated labour supply elasticity 
Compensated labour supply elasticity 
Government spending/GDP 
Fuel production share 
Producer price of fuel (c/gal) 
Initial tax rate on fuel (c/gal) 
21.5 
2.4 
32 
 
10.9 
3.5 
-0.21 
0.4 
0.6 
0.2 
0.35 
0.35 
0.0156 
227 
144.4 
 
Authors’ estimate 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
Assumes carbon at $25/t; energy security 
10c/gal, as per Parry and Small (2007) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) on a mile basis 
Parry (2009) 
Parry and Small (2007) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
Parry and Small (2007) 
Parry and Small (2007) 
Parry and Small (2007) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) low estimate 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) on gallon basis 
Clarke and Prentice (2009) on gallon basis 
 
Table 7: Stanley and Hensher Fuel Charge Estimates for Australia  
Basis of calculation Externality 
Component
Ramsey 
Component
Optimal Tax Revenue/Base
Base estimate 
Accident costs increased (higher 
value of life) 
No congestion costs 
$0.44 
$0.57 
 
$0.39 
$0.50 
$0.55 
 
$0.48 
$0.94 
$1.13 
 
$0.87 
2.27 
2.64 
 
2.11 
 
 
4.2.2 Some Sensitivity Tests 
Estimating the external part of accident costs is a difficult and under-researched area and the AFTS 
analysis (Henry Tax Review) did not include accident externalities in its discussion of road pricing reform.  
There are two major issues in the Australian context: first, estimating accident costs; and second, 
estimating the external part of these costs.   
BITRE (2009a) estimated Australian road crash costs at $17.85 billion in 2006.  That report used a hybrid 
human capital approach to valuing life.  It is arguable that a willingness-to-pay value for life is more 
consistent with other values used in transport cost-benefit studies.   If the Hensher et al. (2009) value of 
$6.2 million for life is used, which is now included in the NSW RTA economic evaluation manual,  BITRE 
(2009a) estimates that total accident costs would increase to $27.12 billion.   
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BIC (2001) cites work that suggests that 20-35% of accident costs might be external, in the sense that 
they are not covered by private insurances.  We use the low end of this range (20%) and apply it to the 
BITRE base accident cost estimate of $17.85 billion to get an estimate of $3.6 billion for the external 
costs of accidents.  If the total cost of accidents increases by $9.27 billion when a willingness-to-pay 
value for life is used, the full amount of this increase in total accident costs can be added to the base 
estimate of accident externalities to re-estimate accident externalities.  This gives a value of $12.9 
billion.  Spread over 224b vkms11, this suggests accident externalities of about 5.8c/km or 9.2c/ml (in 
2006).  This is used as a sensitivity test in Table 7, increasing the optimal fuel tax by 19c/L, with the 
externality component of the tax increasing by 13c/L to 57c/L.  Revenues are an estimated 2.64 times 
current fuel tax revenues under this scenario.   
Given our strong belief that a willingness-to-pay approach is the most suitable way to assess the welfare 
impacts of most public policy, this sensitivity test case is the modelling run on which we would place 
most weight in terms of optimal fuel charging. 
It might be argued that congestion costs should only be levied in some locations, rather than recovered 
through broader charges.  If congestion costs are removed from our base case, Table 7 shows that the 
optimal fuel tax falls from $0.94/L to $0.87/L, with the externality component (39c/L) being almost 
exactly equal to the current excise rate.   This sensitivity test provides a rough basis for identifying which 
particular external costs of Australian road use might be reasonably considered as being internalised, on 
average, through the current excise system.  In making this point, it needs to be recalled that there are 
no road damage costs in the analysis reported in Table 7, since marginal road damage costs of light 
vehicles are negligible and, in a reformed marginal social cost-based road pricing regime, would be 
primarily recovered from heavy vehicles. 
4.2.3 A Vehicle Kilometre Charge 
Parry and Small (2007) demonstrate that economic welfare gains are actually higher with a vehicle mile 
tax (VMT) than with optimal fuel charging, presumably because external costs are more closely driven 
by distance than by fuel use but also because the elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel cost is quite 
small, making VMT a more attractive target than fuel for a Ramsey type revenue raising tax.  The Parry 
and Small optimal VMT is close to what they describe as their “naive externality tax” at current fuel 
economy rates.  In our base run, the naive externality charge, at starting fuel economy rates is $3.93 
gallon, which converts to a charge of 11.4c/km.  In our “Accident costs increased” sensitivity test, the 
charge increases to 15c/km.  In the “No congestion costs” case it falls to 4.6c/km, showing the 
significance of congestion costs within the total set of external costs that have been included in the 
analysis. 
4.2.4 Distributional Consequences 
The equity impact of road pricing reform, and particularly of congestion charging, is a critical issue to be 
considered.  The notion of distributive justice (or equity) is also a complicated concept, which depends 
substantively on context and circumstance.  For example, Santos and Rojey (2004) showed that cordon 
congestion charging can be regressive, progressive, or neutral, depending on the residential and 
employment configuration, and modal choice distribution.  McMullen et al. (2010), in a broader context 
than congestion charging, assess the distributional impacts of a switch from a fuel tax (24 cents per mile) 
to a vehicle miles travelled (VMT) tax (of a flat 1.2 cents per mile) for the state of Oregon, and conclude 
                                                            
11 BITRE (2009b) 
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that the VMT tax is found to be only slightly more regressive than an already regressive fuel tax. A 
particularly interesting finding is that rural households would benefit from a change in tax regimes, 
primarily because of the fact that, on average, such households own vehicles that lower fuel efficiency 
even though they drive greater distances than urban households. 
5. Pathways 
As argued convincingly by SAHA (2010), the level and structure of road user charges that result from a 
reformed Australian road pricing regime will depend significantly on the approach taken by 
governments to what is included/excluded, in terms of external costs, and to decisions on cost-recovery 
targets.  International experience with congestion pricing suggests that, if policy makers are serious 
about implementation of some form of reform program, such decisions should be taken against the 
background of an open community conversation around questions such as: 
 why road pricing needs to change 
 the options for change 
 how these options will impact on various stakeholders 
 what will happen to revenue raised from the charges 
 what measures might be implemented to mitigate particular adverse impacts 
 how privacy will be protected if comprehensive mass, location, distance charging is adopted. 
Such conversation will need about two years and should be managed by eminent independent people, 
who are committed to the need for open dialogue. 
A first step towards implementation may involve changes in way existing toll roads are priced, to 
incorporate a congestion premium.  This will obviously require consideration of existing contractual 
provisions and decisions about how any additional revenue that might result from such a scheme should 
be used.  Alternatively, it may be that off-peak prices are lowered and peak prices are raised, with a 
neutral impact on overall toll-road operator cash flow. 
A variant of this pricing option is development of priced lane on existing toll roads, to guarantee a faster 
trip at congested times.  This gives users an option of paying a higher price for a faster trip.   
Our indicative calculations of externality costs suggest that user charges should increase by 5-10c/L in 
the near term, which could perhaps be achieved by simply adding a carbon charge to the existing excise 
rate, even though this option has been ruled out politically.  The revenue from such a charge should be 
hypothecated to improve land transport systems, including public transport.   
Long term, we see mass, distance, location charging as the ideal solution, because of the flexibility that it 
provides to vary charges for road use to reflect (for example): 
 road damage that relates to vehicle mass and dimensions 
 congestion that is location specific 
 air pollution and noise costs that are also location specific 
 the distance users travel, which will affect the quantum of their social costs. 
 
An important policy decision concerns the extent to which the charging structure seeks to increase the 
revenue raised from road users, to enable increased infrastructure spending.   
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Public transport fare setting should be an integral part of the community conversation about road 
pricing reform.  The current failure to price the external costs of road use is a significant argument in 
favour of governmental funding support for public transport.  If road prices more closely reflect the 
relevant marginal social costs of the travel in question, the case for funding support to public transport 
reduces.  There will still remain strong social safety net arguments for some governmental funding 
support of public transport, even in a regime of marginal social costing of road use. 
6. Concluding Comments 
A growing number of voices are calling for reform of the way road use is priced in Australia, primarily 
because the current pricing regime provides poor price signals for efficient use of scarce road capacity.  
Australian road users currently do not pay enough for their road use, in aggregate, once the external 
costs of road use are recognised.  Peak road use should be more expensive.  Rural road use on high 
quality pavements should arguably be cheaper.  While much of the focus on reforming road pricing has 
been on better pricing congested road use, congestion is only one of a number of costs of road use that 
are inadequately recognised in charging for road use.  International experience suggests that 
implementation of major road pricing reform, particularly involving congestion charging, often starts 
with only minority support, requiring strong political leadership, but is replaced by majority support 
once schemes are in place.   
International experience also suggests that reforming road pricing is hard work and that an engaged 
community is a fundamental pre-requisite.  The COAG Road Pricing Reform for heavy vehicles has been 
a positive initiative.  However, heavy vehicle pricing has an established set of stakeholder relationships 
within which to engage and negotiate reform.  Extensive road pricing reform, involving light vehicles and 
additional costs for both heavy and light vehicles, is more complex and must be undertaken in a more 
open framework.   Reformed road pricing typically starts with minority support but this soon changes to 
majority support, a political context with which Australian politicians are familiar.  Instead of continued 
inter-governmental investigations into road pricing reform, it is time Australia launched an independent 
inquiry into road pricing reform, run by eminent persons reporting directly to COAG.  That inquiry needs 
a two-year time frame for a serious process of research and community engagement, which should 
provide the foundation for real reform, rather than simply more talk.   
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